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‘The Last Great Romantic’: 
Nietzsche’s Romanticism Out of the  
Spirit of Decadence
Mark Sandy
This chapter addresses Nietzsche’s complex relations to, and reactions against, 
those often entwined Romantic and Decadent tendencies that he identifies in 
philosophers, writers, and artists.1 That Nietzsche’s relationship to Romanticism 
and Decadence is both philosophical and poetical in nature indicates the novelty of 
the approach he adopts to the broader questions of art and aesthetics. Reconceiving 
aesthetics from the perspective of the artist, Nietzsche rejects Kantian notions 
of disinterestedness and the transcendental sublime because Kant ‘like all 
philosophers considered art and the beautiful exclusively from the point of view 
of the “spectator”’.2 For Nietzsche, Kant’s metaphysical concept of the beautiful 
‘without interest’ (GM, p. 83) is a denial and an impoverishment of the aesthetic 
experience and, correspondingly, life itself.3
Like metaphysics, nihilism, and pessimism, Decadence for Nietzsche was a 
symptom of the greatest weakness. Decadent exuberance was an act of nay-saying; 
a denial of life on its own unquestionable terms. In this sense, Decadence was not 
merely an illness that infected the period later identified by literary historians as 
the fin de siècle,4 but a sickness capable of manifesting itself in any given epoch, 
stretching as far back as the Socratic age. Nietzsche clearly conceived of this 
1 For readings that align Nietzsche’s sense of Romanticism with Decadence see 
Andrea Gogröf Vorhees, Defining Modernism: Baudelaire and Nietzsche on Romanticism, 
Modernity, and Wagner, Studies in Literary Criticism and Theory 8 (New York: Lang, 
2004), pp. 107–18. See also Mark Sandy, Poetics of Self and Form in Keats and Shelley: 
Nietzschean Subjectivity and Genre (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 1–12. 
For a critique of such readings see Michael Silk, ‘Nietzsche, Decadence, and the Greeks’, 
New Literary History 35 (2004): 595, 587–606. Hereafter NDG. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (1996; 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), p. 83. Hereafter GM.
3 For a detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s re-evaluation of art and aesthetics see 
Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, The Arguments of the Philosophers Series (1983; London: 
Routledge, 1985), pp. 521–2.
4 For a detailed discussion of this see George de Huszar, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of 
Decadence and the Transvaluation of all Values’, Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1945): 
259–60, 259–72.
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914132
Decadent contagion as a historically and philosophically widespread phenomenon, 
as well as identifying ‘dialects as a symptom of décadence, for example in the 
most famous case of all: in the case of Socrates’.5 Socrates’s outward rude health 
and exuberance of spirit and intellect were signs for Nietzsche that, as the Greek 
philosopher recognized in his final moments, ‘Socrates himself has only been 
a long time sick….’6 Socratic reason and ‘dialectic’ (as a means to harmonize 
conflicting appetites) was ‘no physician’ to the condition of life, but only a 
symptom of a Decadent weakness that established a life-denying mastery of self 
and world to which ‘death alone is a physician’ (TI, [12], p. 44). In spite of such 
moments of outright condemnation of Socrates as man and dialectician, Nietzsche 
maintained an ambivalent relationship with the figure of Socrates throughout his 
own career. What Nietzsche found in this figure can be construed, on one hand, as 
a dogmatic life-denying self-mastery on Socrates’s part and, on the other, might be 
conceived of as a creative act of self-fashioning akin to Nietzsche’s own literary 
philosophical endeavours.7 Ironically, then, Socratic self-mastery has the potential 
to fulfil Nietzsche’s expectations of an authentic aesthetic act in the manner of the 
‘grand ambition’: ‘To become master of the chaos one is; to compel one’s chaos 
to become form’.8
Nietzsche’s ambivalence towards Socrates equally holds true for the stance 
he adopts in relation to both Decadence and Romanticism. For all that Nietzsche 
disavows Decadence it remains for him an essential and necessary state, which 
must be endured and overcome.9 As such Decadence is as vital to Nietzsche’s 
thought as experience is to William Blake’s conception of redemption. 
Paradoxically, Nietzsche opposes all that is Decadent and Romantic by virtue of 
his own deliberate absorption in all that Decadence and Romanticism has to offer. 
‘Décadence’, Nietzsche writes in Ecce Homo, ‘is what I have practised most’ and 
‘in this if in anything I am master’ (EH, [1], p. 40). But his account and mastery of 
Decadence, as Nietzsche self-consciously declares, means that ‘I am the opposite 
of a décadent: for I have just described myself’ (EH, [1], p. 41). Decadence is an 
inevitable stage for any epoch; it must be endured and self-overcome.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. and 
intro. R.J. Hollingdale (1979; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988), [1], p. 39. Hereafter 
parenthetically referenced with section and page number as EH. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
and intro. Mic ael Tanner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), [12], p. 44. Hereafter 
parenthetically referenced with section and page number as TI. 
7 Alexander Nehamas offers an excellent reading of the complexities of Nietzsche’s 
sustained ambivalence to Socrates. See Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections 
from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: U of California P, 1998), pp. 153, 128–56. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. R.J. Hollingdale, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage-Random, 1968), III, [842], p. 444. Hereafter 
parenthetically referenced with book, section, and page number as WP.
9 See Silk, NDG, 595.
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‘The Last Great Romantic’ 133
Romanticism and Decadence are pandemics across time, place, and space 
which are an active ‘impoverishment of life’.10 Nietzsche observes in The Gay 
Science that the Romantic spirit – like Decadence – is a sickness which the highest 
type must overcome by conquering ‘not only his time but also his prior aversion 
and contradiction against this time, his suffering from this time, his un-timeliness, 
his romanticism’ (GS, V, [380], p. 343). Nietzsche’s diagnosis extends to all the 
great names (including Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and by implication 
his own) of German philosophy, which he proclaims ‘is the most fundamental form 
of romanticism’ (WP, II, [419], p. 225). Nietzsche implicates himself further in the 
catastrophe of Romanticism by denouncing his early work, The Birth of Tragedy, 
in a later ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’ (1886), as a re-enactment of ‘the familiar 
romantic finale – break, break down, return and collapse before an old faith’.11
As with Decadence, Nietzsche presents himself as an outsider commenting on 
the fallacy of the ‘romantic credo’ and, simultaneously, a conspirator implicated 
in the impending cultural disaster of Decadence already synonymous with 
Romanticism. Nietzsche’s theatrical positioning of himself in these dual roles 
illustrates his alertness to his own literary and philosophical transformations 
over the duration of his writing career. Curiously, this artistic self-consciousness 
possessed by Nietzsche as a writer makes him akin to the fantastical creature of the 
Romantic poet’s imagination which is, as we are told in The Birth of Tragedy, ‘like 
the weird image of the fairy tale [that] can turn its eyes at will and behold itself; 
he is at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator’ (BT, p. 52). 
If Nietzsche was in opposition to Decadence as a consequence of his own self-
conscious immersion in all things Decadent, then Nietzsche was also a Romantic 
type, at once antithetical to, and implicated in, the traits of Romanticism that he 
outwardly deplores.
As Henry Staten neatly proposes, ‘Romanticism would not be something 
external to Nietzsche’s project but something that works from within, as what has 
to be opposed so strenuously because it is so intimate, so proper to Nietzsche’s 
own economy.’12 Much the same can be said of the ambivalent presence of 
Decadence in Nietzsche’s intellectual economy. An affinity with Schopenhauer’s 
Decadent aesthetics and ‘romantic pessimism’ is evident in The Birth of Tragedy, 
where Nietzsche believes that the tragic and destructive art of the Dionysian 
(particularly expressed through music) discloses something of the true character 
of a chaotic reality without order, rules, purpose, or meaning. In essence, the 
Dionysian encapsulates precisely what Nietzsche later defines as Romantic art 
in opposition to Apollonian Classical forms of art. Nietzsche conceives of life, 
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage-Random, 1974), V, [370], p. 328. Hereafter parenthetically referenced with book, 
section, and page number as GS. 
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Random, 1967), p. 11. Hereafter BT.
12 Henry Staten, Nietzsche’s Voice (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990), p. 215.
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914134
history, even existence itself, as a process of mourning communicated through the 
Dionysian spirit of music which speaks only of ‘the elegiac sorrow of an eternal 
loss’ (BT, p. 118). The Dionysian discloses a tragic realism beneath the calm 
surface of the appearance of things.13
On Nietzsche’s account, the music of Dionysian tragedy reveals to us that 
our ordered reality of rules, meaning, and purpose is nothing more than an 
illusion. Such illusion, even a form of self-delusion, belongs to the aspirations of 
Apollonian art which envisions order and harmony to ensure that ‘beauty triumphs 
over the suffering inherent in life’ (BT, p. 104). This harmonious illusory dream 
of Apollonian art is the exact opposite of the tragic affirmation of reality revealed 
by its Dionysian counterpart. Dionysian art, for Nietzsche, does not only make us 
realize the tragic and chaotic nature of reality, but also consoles us by ending our 
sense of separation from the world around us by piercing us with ‘the maddening 
sting of these pains just when we have become, as it were, one with the infinite 
primordial joy in this metaphysical comfort’ (BT, pp. 104–5). In direct contrast, 
Nietzsche’s concept of Apollonian art ‘tears us from Dionysian universality 
and lets us find delight in individuals; it attached outward pity to them, and by 
means of them it satisfies our sense of beauty which longs for great and sublime 
forms’ (BT, p. 128). It is through a discussion of Schopenhauer’s concept of art 
and the negation of the will that Nietzsche eventually conceives of the Dionysian 
and Apollonian forms of art as not mutually exclusive, but interrelated so that 
‘Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo and Apollo, finally the language of 
Dionysus’ (BT, p. 130). Arguably by extension neither, then, does Nietzsche’s 
distinction between bad (Decadent) Romantic art and good (pure) Classical art 
hold fast since both forms could give shape to authentic or inauthentic sentiments; 
both forms of art could potentially enrich or impoverish life.
Similar to the treatment of Socrates, Nietzsche’s ambivalent response 
to Schopenhauer is also instructive about his conflicted attitudes towards 
Romanticism. Much debate has centred on whether Nietzsche upholds or denies 
Schopenhauer’s severe pessimism about existence conceived of as endless 
suffering and illusion born of our submission to the demands of the will. For 
Schopenhauer, the will – closely aligned with Kant’s notion of the ‘thing-in-itself’ – 
is sovereign of all our knowledge and reason, existing outside of the confines of 
space and time. Paradoxically, the best life, then, is driven by the will towards its 
ultimate telos or end purpose manifest in its own annihilation. Only through art 
and our experience of the aesthetic, Schopenhauer contends, is this power of the 
will temporarily overcome or negated. The tragic mode, for Schopenhauer, brings 
13 Writing on the purpose of fiction, Jonathan Franzen construes the Apollonian and 
Dionysian mode (once the former is assumed by the latter) as a ‘tragic realism’; glossing 
The Birth of Tragedy he writes that ‘an anarchic “Dionysian” insight into the darkness 
and unpredictability of life is wedded to an “Apollonian” clarity and beauty of form to 
produce an experience that’s religious in its intensity. Even for people who don’t believe 
in anything … the formal aesthetic rendering of the human plight can be … redemptive’ 
(p. 91). See Franzen, ‘Why Bother?’, How to be Alone (London: Fourth Estate, 2002).
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‘The Last Great Romantic’ 135
us into ‘complete knowledge of the nature of the world, which has a quietening 
effect on the will’ (original emphasis). Writing of one of the highest modes of the 
aesthetic in The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer adapts Leibnitz’s words to 
claim that ‘music is the unconscious exercise in metaphysics in which the mind 
does not know that it is philosophising’.14 That Nietzsche’s subtitle to the first 
edition of The Birth of Tragedy read ‘Out of the Spirit of Music’ suggests that a 
younger Nietzsche shared, perhaps, before his decisive break with Wagner, some 
of Schopenhauer’s assumptions about the role of music and art more generally 
even if, by contrast, he conceived of Dionysian tragic disclosure as a means of 
agitating the will.
Nietzsche’s preference for Dionysian forms of art – appropriately described 
through the language of intoxication – suggests both Schopenhauer’s influence 
on Nietzsche’s early thought and aligns him with those pessimistic Romantics 
who ‘suffer from an impoverishment of life and seek rest, stillness, calm seas, 
redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, 
convulsions, anaesthesia, and madness’ (GS, IV, [370], p. 328). Crucial to Nietzsche’s 
early and later thought is his conception of art as encompassing life, which is only 
possible because he conceives of life, fundamentally, as art.15 This model of life 
as art enables Nietzsche, at his most accusatory, to discern between those of a 
Romantic disposition who seek ‘calm seas … and redemption for themselves’ and 
those, so he believes like himself, in Untimely Meditations, who advocate art as 
a ‘voyage over strange [Fremden] dark seas’.16 It would seem that bad art is the 
creation of those Romantic Decadents so detested by Nietzsche. Yet Nietzsche’s 
imagery for these opposing types of art point to nominal differences between 
them and evidently is born of his preference for Dionysian intoxication over sober 
Apollonian order. Nietzsche’s privileging of Dionysian over Apollonian art is not 
in itself anti-Romantic but, in fact, merely a preference for one kind of aesthetic 
illusion over another. Arguably, the respective masks of Apollo and Dionysus 
symbolize two distinct illusory modes of Romanticism, one the light of visionary 
transformation and the other of dark, decadent, and destructive disclosure.17 
Adopting a positive logical stance in Human, All Too Human, written (as 
its subtitle, ‘A Book for Free Spirits’, suggests) after the split with Wagner,18 
Nietzsche berates art for its capacity for illusion and as one of the vestiges of the 
human impulse towards the metaphysical:
14 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, ed. David Berman and trans. Jill 
Berman (London: Everyman, 1995), III, p. 172, III, p. 160. Hereafter WWI.
15 See Alexander Nehamas, Life as Literature: Nietzsche (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1985), for the centrality of art to Nietzsche’s thinking about the self and world. 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale and intro. 
J.P. Stern (1983; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), p. 116. Hereafter UM.
17 See Caroline ‘Kay’ Joan S. Picart, ‘Nietzsche as Masked Romantic’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55 (1997): 273–91. 
18 See Carl Pletsch, Young Nietzsche: Becoming a Genius (1991; New York: Free, 
1992), p. 202.
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914136
Art makes the thinker’s heart heavy. – How strong the metaphysical need is and 
how hard nature makes it to bid it a final farewell, can be seen from the fact that 
even when the free spirit has divested himself of everything metaphysical the 
highest effects of art can easily set the metaphysical strings, which have long 
been silent or indeed snapped apart, vibrating in sympathy; so it can happen, 
for example, that a passage in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony will make him feel 
he is hovering above the earth in a dome of stars with the dream of immortality 
in his heart: all the stars seem to glitter around him and the earth sinks farther 
and farther away. – If he becomes aware of being in this condition he feels a 
profound stab in the heart and sighs for the man who will lead him back to his 
lost love, whether she be called religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments 
that his intellectual probity is put to the test. (Original emphases)19 
Here Nietzsche avows and recreates the transformative effects (albeit illusory 
or delusory) of the power of art. As an artist Nietzsche beautifully captures the 
transformation brought about within the listener who, enwrapped in Beethoven’s 
symphony, transcends place and time to be, momentarily, at one with the starry 
firmament. But Nietzsche’s artistry and rhetoric is carefully controlled and 
self-consciously aware, ‘like the weird image of the fairy tale [that] can turn 
its eyes at will and behold itself’ (BT, p. 52), that ‘such moments’ both harbour 
and are punctured by a ‘profound’ pang and hankering after the ‘lost love’ 
of the metaphysical. Such a painful self-realization is enacted by Nietzsche’s 
staged switch from an artistic flourish of vision to the philosophical question of 
‘intellectual probity’. Romantic high vision masks only an old dependency and, 
for all its seeming transcendence, gives sway to a more painful realization and 
encounter with the contingent conditions of existence that such vision sought to 
evade. As we have seen elsewhere, then art (Romantic or otherwise) and artistry, 
at least as it is self-consciously practiced by Nietzsche, is all the more authentic 
for an awareness of its own fictive and illusory state. As such Nietzsche comes 
perilously close to taking on the role of the poet-prophet or priest that he seeks 
to ascribe to the Romantic artist.20 Nietzsche’s channelling of artistic vision and 
his rhetorically assured revelation that such vision is a haven for a desire for the 
metaphysical presents the philosopher as vatic figure.
These generative moments of philosophical ambivalence also characterize 
Nietzsche’s more overtly poetic enterprises. This is not to suggest that Nietzsche 
as poet and Nietzsche as philosopher are easily divisible from one another. 
Nietzsche’s serious and lifelong commitment to the poetic and the creative 
endeavour of writing poetry suggests the exact opposite. James Luchte, a recent 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale and intro. Richard Schact (1986; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1996), [153], p. 82.
20 As Julian Young observes of this passage from Nietzsche, ‘If art functions for us as 
a substitute for religion then the artist must occupy a role similar to that of the priest or poet’ 
(Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art (1992; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), p. 66). See also 
Young’s account of Nietzsche’s use of rhetoric against the ‘metaphysical in art’ (pp. 67–9). 
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‘The Last Great Romantic’ 137
editor of Nietzsche’s poetry, argues that Nietzsche’s writing of poetry was an 
attempt to disclose the fundamentally bleak Dionysian nature of existence central 
to his philosophy and to give form to his philosophical desire to overcome life. 
Akin to Nietzsche’s philosophical project, his creative endeavours as poet trace 
contradictory impulses towards escapist (Apollonian) transcendence and tragic 
affirmation (Dionysian disclosure) of reality in its rawest form.21 
Nietzsche’s poetry is as confrontational as it is fragile and delicately aware of 
the limitations of its own power. This fragility in vexed moments of doubt, akin to 
what has been termed a Romantic anxiety of reception,22 about whether the poetry 
of Nietzsche will find a readership is evident when he disparagingly declares: 
‘What does it matter? Who reads what I write?’ (‘The Pen Scribbles’) [‘Was tut’s? 
Wer liest denn, was ich schreibe?’ (‘Die Feder kritzelt’)]. Elsewhere Nietzsche asks 
both of the music of the gondolier and his own poetry, ‘Was anyone listening?’ 
(‘I stand on the bridge’) [‘Hörte jemand ihr zu?’ (‘An der Brücke stand’)]. There 
are also other more profoundly vexing moments in which poetry emerges as a 
spent force even before the instance of its own utterance; rather like the words 
of a reluctant suitor, the poet ‘casts an empty word to wile away the time: / Into 
the blue …’ (‘The unwilling seducer’) [‘schoß ein leeres Wort zum Zeitvertreib / 
Ins Blaue …’ (‘Der unfreiwillige Verführer’)]. Poetry, simultaneously, gestures 
towards a potentially contained meaning and a world beyond, as its ‘empty word’ 
vaporizes meaninglessly into the ‘blue’ th t the poem conjures into being. This 
evanescent sense of the power of language and poetry, for Nietzsche, is anticipated 
by Shelley’s notion that poetic ‘words / Are as the air’.23 For Shelley, the strength of 
poetic language resides in its weakness, its resilience in its own fragile imaginings, 
which evaporate as vitally and intangibly ‘as the air’ we breathe. Words, like the 
shimmering insubstantial presence of Venice and the city’s captivatingly fleeting 
music, observed by Nietzsche, are as ‘Golden drops [which] swell / Over the 
trembling surface’ (‘I stand on the bridge’) [‘goldener Tropfen quoll’s / über die 
zitternde Fläche weg’ (‘An der Brücke stand’)] of the lagoon. In Nietzsche’s ‘I 
stand on the bridge’, the outwardly observed unreality of Venice melts into the 
21 See James Luchte, ed., The Peacock and the Buffalo: The Poetry of Friedrich 
Nietzsche (London: Continuum, 2010), pp. 36–8. All quotations from Nietzsche’s poetry are 
taken from this parallel text edition and reproduced in English and German. Any alterations 
to the English translations in this edition are indicated in square brackets in the main body 
of the text. I am indebted to Michael Mack for his considerable assistance with and advice 
about the subtleties of the German language.
22 See Lucy Newlyn, Reading, Writing, and Romanticism: The Anxiety of Reception 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000).
23 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. 
Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat (1977; New York: Norton, 2002), II, i, 109, p. 237. 
Nietzsche writes in a letter, dated 28 August 1877, ‘Very recently I spent a veritable day of 
consecration reading Prometheus Unbound. If the poet is not a real genius, I do not know 
what a genius is….’ See Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Christopher 
Middleton (1966; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), p. 164. Hereafter SLN. 
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914138
‘radical subjectivity’24 of the observer’s inward ‘soul’ [‘Seele’] that – recalling 
the ‘gondola song’ [‘Gondellied dazu’] – ‘Sings to itself’ [‘sang sich’] in a self-
enclosed twilit reverie.
When Nietzsche incorporated this Apollonian-Dionysian moment of poetic 
reverie into his quasi-autobiography, Ecce Homo, he emphasized the tragic joy of 
not knowing ‘how to distinguish between tears and music’. Venice, for Nietzsche, 
becomes a synonym of both ‘music’ and a form of ‘happiness’ touched by ‘a 
shudder of faintheartedness’ (EC, [7], p. 64). By recalling Shelley’s own sense 
that ‘words / Are as the air’, Nietzsche’s ‘stringed instrument’ [‘Saitenspiel’] of 
the soul is ‘plucked invisibly’ and perceptibly by an imagined musician’s fingers in 
‘I stand on the bridge’. Consequently, the soul’s internal serenade finds an external 
correspondent in the gondolier’s song, which ‘Trembles with colourful happiness’ 
[‘zitternd vor bunter Seligkeit’], as outer and inner states blur indeterminately, in 
the Venetian twilight. This fascination (also shared by Shelley and Byron) with the 
quality of Venetian light extends beyond the gloaming as poetic topos. 
Sight and sound, colour and meaning are at the very heart of what Nietzsche 
thought made for great writing, which places the onus on the reader to be both 
receptive to and perceptive of shifts in rhythm, tone, and nuances of sense. It 
was one thing for the writer to give a virtuoso performance, but quite another 
for the reader to be a connoisseur who is refined enough to be attuned to the 
subtle changes in metrics, modulations, and moods of a composition.25 Nietzsche 
encapsulates this notion in Beyond Good and Evil, where he writes:
That one must be in no doubt about the syllables that determine rhythm that 
one should feel the disruption of a too-severe symmetry as intentional and as 
something attractive, that one should lend a refined and patient ear to every 
stocatto, every rubato, that one should divine the meaning in the sequence of 
vowels and dipthongs and how delicately and richly they can colour and re-
colour one another through the order in which they come….26 
In ‘I stand on the bridge’ Nietzsche’s sense of, and sensitivity to, sound and colour 
(and re-colouring) traces a temporal and spatial movement from ‘brown night’ 
[‘brauner Nacht’] to ‘dawn’ [‘Dämrung hinaus’] but, more importantly, shows 
the contingent relations between the invisible and visible worlds; between those 
inward and outward modes of being that impinge upon the world and a world that 
impinges upon those modes of being. Poem and world are not only fashioned out 
of but constituted from their trembling ‘colourful’ shifts in shade, tone, and feeling 
that act as a broker between subjective and objective worlds.
24 See Michael O’Neill, Mark Sandy, and Sarah Wootton, ‘Introduction’, Venice and 
the Cultural Imagination (London: Chatto, 2012), p. 1. 
25 For an excellent discussion of Nietzsche on ‘Moods’ and writing see Stanley 
Corngold, ‘Nietzsche’s Moods’, Studies in Romanticism 29 (1990): 67–90. 
26 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale and intro. Michael Tanner (1973; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 
[246], p. 178.
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‘Colour’, as Shahidha K. Bari observes of John Keats’s poetics, ‘yields both 
to subjective possession and objective fact; it ties the perceptual facility of the 
subject to a world that calls upon it.’27 Against the ‘theorem of Goethe’, Nietzsche 
seems to have held with Schopenhauer’s notion of ‘colo[u]r as primarily a 
physiological product of the eye’ (SLN, p. 72). For Schopenhauer, the delightful 
effects of colours are most acute ‘when they are transparent’, because they are 
entirely dependent ‘upon the fact that light is the correlative and condition of the 
most perfect mode of knowledge’ (WWI, p. 123). Nietzsche may share in this view 
of colour as intersubjective, but his poetry favours the disclosure of Dionysian 
darkness over the light of the Apollonian mode of perfected knowledge. With the 
deferred pronoun and subject in the opening of ‘Lonely, through the dark blue’, 
distinctions between self and world, between the moment of perception and 
perceived colour, break down:
Lonely, through the dark blue,
Night sky I see
Lightning strike
From brewing clouds.
Lonely stands the pine tree
Far upon the mountain.
In the red light,
Smoke drifts toward the forest.
In the distant sky lights
Rain falls silently and gently,
Sad, dreadful, in its own way. – 
Einsam durch den düsterblauen,
Nächten Himmel she ich grelle
Blitze zucken an den Brauen
Schwarzgewölbter Wolkenwelle.
Einsam loht der Stamm der Fichte
Fern an duftger Bergeshalde.
Drüber hin im roten Lichte
Zieht der fahle Rauch zum Walde.
In des Himmels ferns Leuchten
Rinnt der Regen zart und leise,
Traurig schaurig, eigner Weise. – 
Nietzsche’s deliberate verbal slippage between observing subject and observed 
objects (night sky, lone pine, lightning strike) fuses together the interior and 
exterior worlds in the stanza, which are immersed in, and felt through, those 
outer and inner spaces of ‘dark blue’. This fusion creates an inner or emotional 
landscape which, reminiscent of one of David Caspar Friedrich’s emotionally 
27 Shahidha K. Bari, Keats and Philosophy: The Life of Sensations (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), p. 72.
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914140
intense pictorial landscapes,28 conflates the isolated watcher of night skies with the 
‘lonely pine’ wounded by the ‘lightning strike’. Such emotional intensity prepares 
the reader for a description of the falling rain as both subjectively charged with – 
and objectively observed as – ‘Sad, dreadful, in its own way’. 
In the remainder of the concluding section of ‘Lonely, through the dark blue’, 
the silent and gentle raindrops give sway to ‘tear-stained eyes’ [‘tränenfeuchten / 
Augen’] that speak of a ‘pain and heartache’ [‘schmerzlich, herzlich’] that is distinct 
from, and yet has everything to do with, the preceding landscape felt ‘through the 
dark blue’. By implication, the ‘You and I’ of a former relationship are, ironically, 
united in their shared isolation and suffering, capable only of ‘Recalling our / 
Forlorn hours’ [‘Verlorne Stunden’]. The negative emotional depths of those 
‘Forlorn hours’ by the poem’s passage ‘through the dark blue’ of inward and 
outward nocturnal terrains are thrown into an ever-darkening relief by the dramatic 
illumination of lightning and subsequent fiery ‘red light’ [‘roten lichte’]. Finally, 
Nietzsche’s ‘lonely’ presences in these exteriorized and interiorized landscapes are 
translated into a decadent abandonment and ‘lost happiness’ [‘zerronnen Glück’].
Much of Nietzsche’s early and later poems coalesce the constitutive elements 
of observing self and observed world through their treatment, often in visceral 
terms, of colour, changing shades, and altering light. In another of Nietzsche’s 
early poems, ‘Remembrance’ [‘Erinnerung’], the boundaries between star gazer 
and night sky, between vision and actuality, are at best semi-permeable, if not, in 
the end, untenable:
It twitches the lips and the eyes laugh,
And still rises the vision reproachful,
From the deep, deep heart of the night –
The gentle star at my heaven’s door.
He lights up triumphantly – and the
Lips close tightly and tears flow.
Es zuckt die Lippe und das Auge lacht,
Und doch steigt’s vorwurfsvoll empor,
Das Bild aus tiefer, tiefer Herzensnacht –
Der milde Stern an meines Himmels Tor.
Er leuchtet siegreich – und die Lippe schließt.
Sich dichter – und die Träne fließt.
Here the ‘deep, deep heart of the night’ is both desired and disavowed; its illumination 
by ‘The gentle star at my heaven’s door’ is a triumph of Romantic (epiphanic) 
illumination, as much as it threatens a collapse into a Dionysian tragic realization. 
Nietzsche’s enigmatic representation of the recuperative and corrosive effect of 
memory is, perhaps, anticipated by Shelley’s bittersweet symbiotic relationship 
of those ‘Odours, [that] when sweet violets sicken, / Live within the sense they 
28 For a detailed account of David Caspar Friedrich’s influence on Nietzsche see 
Picart, ‘Nietzsche as Masked Romantic’, pp. 273–91.
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quicken –’ (‘Memory’, ll. 7–8).29 Similarly, Nietzsche’s the ‘deep heart of the night’ 
is connected with, and disconnected from, the human heart. In a further moment 
of illumination (figured in the second stanza as ‘the shining flames of lightning’ 
[‘Blicke glänzende Funken’]), this implied human heart finds its own foundational 
‘trembling ground’ [‘zitternder Grund’] breaking apart. So, too, does the ground of 
Nietzsche’s poem shift from the ‘deep heart of the night’ as a sought-after source 
of revelation to an obscuring, ominous presence which, as the speaker-observer 
attests, is ‘Clouding my sky’ [‘Wölbt, sich mein Himmel, wehmuttrunken’]. 
Inward and outward skies are obscured, as the capacity for visionary and physical 
sight is closed down along with the possibility of recollecting the reluctant ‘vision 
reproachful’ of some previous epiphany, past event, or lost scene. 
These haunted and haunting metaphorical and actual landscapes recur in 
Nietzsche’s later poetry of the Dionysos Dithyrambs. Zarathustra’s desire for the 
abyss, in ‘Between Birds of Prey’ [‘Zwischen Raubvögeln’] is, recalling ‘Lonely 
through the dark blue’, likened to a solitary ‘pine tree’ [‘Tanne’] that ‘has taken root 
where / The rock itself shudders and looks into the deep’ [‘schlägt Wurzeln, wo / 
der Fels selbst schaudernd / zur Tiefe blickt’] and endures ‘Patiently suffering, – 
hard, silent, alone …’ [‘geduldig duldend, hart, schweigsam, / einsam …’] The 
ways in which Nietzsche’s poetry frequently testifies to a painful, Dionysian 
realization born of a more optimistic, Apollonian impulse towards revelation. 
Perhaps a Nietzschean recasting of Shelley’s poetic mode of sceptical idealism 
recognized that ‘Hope creates / From its own wreck the thing it contemplates’ 
(Prometheus Unbound, IV, ll. 573–4). Like Shelley, Nietzsche derives a certain 
kind of poetic dynamism from a ‘creative-destructive aesthetic’30 that breaks with 
fixed models of subjectivity. In the ironically titled Ecce Homo (also adopted as 
the title of Nietzsche’s semi-autobiography), the mercurial speaker encapsulates a 
phoenix-like cycle of powerful self-creation and destruction:
Yes! I know where I come from!
Like an insatiable flame,
I glow and devour myself,
Everything I hold becomes bright
What I leave is like coal:
I am flame.
Ja! Ich, weiß, woher ich stamme!
Ungesättigt gleich der Flamme
Glühe und verzehr ich mich.
Licht wird alles, was ich fasse:
Kohle alles, was ich lasse
Flamme bin ich sicherlich.
29 Shelley’s ‘Memory’ and ‘To –’ are draft versions of the same poem; the version 
entitled ‘Memory’ was first published in Mary Shelley’s edition of her husband’s 
Posthumous Poems (1824). See editors’ footnote, p. 469, n. 1. 
30 See Timothy Clark, Embodying Revolution: The Figure of the Poet in Shelley 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989), pp. 221–3.
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914142
‘My soul’ [‘Meine Seele’], as Nietzsche writes later in the Dionysos Dithyrambs, 
‘is itself a flame: / insatiable for a few distances / blaze upwards, upwards you 
still glow’ (‘The fire sign’) [selber ist diese Flamme: / unersättlich nach neuen 
Fernen / lodert aufwärts ihre stille Glut’ (‘Das Feuerzeichen’)]. Origin of the ‘I’ 
is potently elemental with the capacity to transfigure all that it comes into contact 
with illuminative brightness. Yet the discarded remainder of ‘coal’31 points to the 
transitory nature of these moments of illumination and the high (incendiary) price 
that may have to be paid for such enlightenment. For all the emphasis given to 
the elemental creative force of ‘flame’, there is a concurrent awareness of the 
destructive element of fire and its own self-devouring nature. Light (‘bright’) 
and darkness (‘coal’) are the originator, intensifier, and destroyer of one another, 
nourishing each other ‘Like darkness’, as Shelley writes, ‘to a dying flame’ 
(‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’, ll. 44–5). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche’s poet-speaker 
is at once a fiery rebellious Prometheus and a darkly self-devoured Dionysus, 
the power of their poetic presence or utterance akin to Shelley’s notion of the 
evanescent brilliance of ‘the mind in creation [that] is as a fading coal which some 
invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness’. 
Such ‘transitory brightness’ finds expression, for Shelley, in the subtly physical 
shifts in tone, and manifestations, of ‘the colour of a flower which fades and 
changes as it is developed’ (A Defence of Poetry, p. 531).
Following in the footsteps of Nietzsche the philosopher, Nietzsche as poet 
resists, as much as he feels, the allure of this kind of Romantic aesthetics, 
denouncing the poet as ‘fool’ [‘Narr’] and the art of poetry as ‘colourful speaking’ 
[‘Buntes redend’]:
From a colourful larval fool,
Climbing upon false broken
Words and false rainbows
Between false heavens … 
Aus Narrenlarven bunt herausredend,
Herumsreigend auf lü nerischen Wortbrücken,
Auf Lügen-Regenbogen
Zwischen falschen Himmeln …
Nietzsche’s accusation that the poet is nothing more than ‘a colourful larval fool’ 
points to his alertness to his own literary and philosophical transformations over 
the duration of his writing career, as well as finding an ironic affinity with Keats’s 
negatively capable ‘camelion poet’.32 This theatrical break with Romantic illusion 
31 Translated by Mark Daniel Cohen in a more poetically Shelleyan vein as ‘embers’ 
(p. 9). Shelley writes in The Triumph of Life of the Shape all Light that ‘Her feet like 
embers … / Trampled its fires into the dust of death’ (ll. 387–8). See Cohen, ‘Nietzsche: A 
Selection of Poems in Translation’, Hyperion 2.4 (2007): 1–17. 
32 John Keats, The Letters of John Keats (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958), I, p. 386.
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lays bare the falsified fabrications and promises of the poet’s ‘colourful speaking’ 
and opens up a decadent world of ‘broken words’ which luxuriates in the falsity of 
previously invented ‘colourful’ poetic fictions. This sense of having ‘broken an old 
time / Legacy’ [‘Ich hab gebrochen alter Zeit / Vermächtnis’] with the Romantic 
figure of the child and nature characterizes one of Nietzsche’s youthful poems 
where, writing out of despondency, the speaker-observer claims:
I can hardly see the sky anymore,
The blue [M]ay:
Wild delusions of lust and horror
Storm over me.
Ich kann den Himmel kaum mehr sehn,
Den maienblauen:
So überstürmen wilde Wehn
Mich jetzt mit Lust und Grauen.
This earlier, perhaps also staged, falling away from what could be understood 
as a Romantic idealism is construed by Nietzsche as an inability to sense the 
colour ‘blue’, a colour, often associated with expanses of sky or sea, and its 
perceptible qualities that seem to have fascinated (as we have seen) Nietzsche 
as poet. Nietzsche’s poetic eye is drawn to the unique hue of a May sky and its 
distinctive seasonal quality of light that both illumines and obscures the possibility 
of vision and meaning. Paradoxically, the extraordinary light of ‘blue [M]ay’ hints 
at a loss of poetic vision or perception and still holds out for the possibility that 
not everything is lost to the destruc ive, decadent, stormy ‘delusions of lust and 
horror’ that crowd all about the moment when necessary, albeit false, romanticized 
fictions of rainbows, heavens, selfhood, and love are cast down. Poetic or 
otherwise, fictions no matter how fragile or falsifying make life possible, for as 
Nietzsche believes in The Gay Science, it is only ‘As an aesthetic phenomenon 
existence is still endurable to us’ (GS, [107], p. 163). 
Equally Nietzsche attests elsewhere, the best and most authentic kind of art 
is ‘the great means of making life possible, the great seduction to life, the great 
stimulant of life’ (WP, III, [853], p. 452). Poetry is one such stimulant of art 
that, for Nietzsche, inevitably involves a ‘wild and erring voyage over strange 
[Fremden] dark seas’ (UM, p. 116). This conception of art as a precarious and 
potentially treacherous seafaring finds a Romantic precedent in Shelley’s 
declaration that ‘I am borne, darkly, fearfully, afar’ (Adonais, 55, l. 492). Poetic 
artistry and self-discovery are enterprises that both belong to an eternal process 
of becoming in which life itself is shaped through art and subjectivity, as in 
Nietzsche’s poetic experiments, emerges ‘a dangerous going across, a dangerous 
wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and staying-still’.33 
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (1961; 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 43.
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Decadent Romanticism: 1780–1914144
By advocating, then, the potential redemption of life through an authentic art self-
consciously aware of the Dionysian burden of existence, Nietzsche might easily 
reverse his claim about the impoverishment of Romantic art. If all life is modelled 
on art, then all art works must constitute illusions of varying kinds which (though 
they could be said in this sense to be life-denying) lead to either a Romantic or 
Decadent disillusionment and a confrontation with life itself. 
Inflected by Nietzsche, the last poems of the Irish poet W.B. Yeats question the 
value of art and affirm a tragic encounter with life, acknowledging that all poetic 
‘masterful images … began’ in ‘A mound of refuse or the sweepings of the street’.34 
Similarly, the post-Nietzschean American poet Wallace Stevens speculates that 
poetry is ‘the mind in the act of finding / What will suffice’.35 Nietzsche may 
have refuted his status as a Romantic, but his poetic and philosophic legacy 
inspired a lineage of poets and artists, who thought of themselves as self-conscious 
advocates of a darker, tragic, Dionysian Romanticism. Whether by intrinsic design 
or extrinsic forces of fickle fortune, they, with Nietzsche, became the company of 
last great Romantics born out of the spirit of Decadence.
34 W.B. Yeats, ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’, W.B. Yeats: The Major Works, ed. 
Edward Larrissy (1997; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), ll. 30–33, p. 181. 
35 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Wallace Stevens: Collected Poems (1984; 
London: Faber, 2006), p. 43.
